Representation of the core of convex measure games via Kantorovich potentials

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.03.001zbMath1125.91012OpenAlexW2084923072MaRDI QIDQ2581794

Guillaume Carlier

Publication date: 10 January 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

rearrangementsKantorovich potentialscore of convex measure games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
• Convex games and extreme points
• Core of convex distortions of a probability.
• A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives
• Measure preserving transformations and rearrangements
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Theory of capacities
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
• Ultramodular Functions

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