Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00043-9zbMath0962.91054MaRDI QIDQ1576470

Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal

Publication date: 21 June 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

prices; Cournot-Nash equilibria; limit exchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

Related Items

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders, A general equilibrium analysis of strategic arbitrage, Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian, Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium, Strategic market games: an introduction., Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets., Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: A comparison between two models, Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities, Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot-Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part, Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders, Large market games, the law of one price, and market structure, Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
• Price-mediated trade with quantity signals: An axiomatic approach.
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy