Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
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Publication:1576470
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00043-9zbMath0962.91054OpenAlexW1990936042MaRDI QIDQ1576470
Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal
Publication date: 21 June 2001
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00043-9
Related Items (16)
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities ⋮ Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot-Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets. ⋮ On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian ⋮ Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian ⋮ Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium ⋮ Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders ⋮ Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders ⋮ A general equilibrium analysis of strategic arbitrage ⋮ Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part ⋮ Large market games, the law of one price, and market structure ⋮ An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly ⋮ Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: A comparison between two models
Cites Work
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- The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
- Price-mediated trade with quantity signals: An axiomatic approach.
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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