Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110043zbMath1471.91278OpenAlexW3195941215MaRDI QIDQ1984456

Francesca Busetto, Ludovic A. Julien, Giulio Codognato

Publication date: 16 September 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110043

zbMATH Keywords

Walras equilibriumCournot-Nash equilibriumLeontievian preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model

Cites Work

• Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
• Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian
• A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
• The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
• Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
• A strategic market game with complete markets
• Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders

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