Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00014-4zbMath1063.91020OpenAlexW2102378736MaRDI QIDQ1401108

Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(03)00014-4

zbMATH Keywords

equivalencemarket games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Switching from complete to incomplete information ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

Cites Work

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