The complexity of equilibria: Hardness results for economies via a correspondence with games
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2008.08.007zbMath1162.91015OpenAlexW2071472458MaRDI QIDQ959811
Yinyu Ye, Bruno Codenotti, Amin Saberi, Kasturi R. Varadarajan
Publication date: 12 December 2008
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.08.007
linear complementarityNash equilibriumNP-hardnessexchange economybimatrix gamesquasi-equilibriumLeontief economyNP-completness
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (6)
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