Dynamic price formation in a futures market via double auctions
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Publication:1341511
DOI10.1007/BF01213623zbMath0815.90046OpenAlexW2018537170MaRDI QIDQ1341511
Publication date: 5 January 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213623
speculative marketabsence of liquidity tradersexistence of a perfect equilibriumprocess of price formationsequential anonymous auctions game
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
- The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
- Anonymous sequential games
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
- Futures Trading, Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- The Price Variability-Volume Relationship on Speculative Markets
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