Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0451-3zbMath1200.91181OpenAlexW2083784054MaRDI QIDQ971895

Jamsheed Shorish

Publication date: 17 May 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1690/1/es-186.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learningrational expectations equilibriumcomputationmarket gameBayesian updating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

The social value of information with an endogenous public signal

Cites Work

• Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
• Bayesian-Walrasian equilibria: Beyond the rational expectations equilibrium
• On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Existence and local uniqueness of functional rational expectations equilibria in dynamic economic models
• Nash equilibria of market games: Finiteness and inefficiency
• Repeated trade and the velocity of money
• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
• Local coordination and market equilibria.
• Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Temporary General Equilibrium Theory
• Stability of functional rational expectations equilibria

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