The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: an extension of the sure-thing principle

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.016zbMath1483.91066OpenAlexW4210752643MaRDI QIDQ2078088

Dov Samet

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.016

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeagreeing to disagreesure thing principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (1)

The sure-thing principle

Cites Work

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• Learning to agree
• Agreeing to disagree: the non-probabilistic case
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF BELIEF: THE MODAL LOGIC PERSPECTIVE
• Quantified beliefs and believed quantities

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