PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE

DOI10.1017/S1755020314000380zbMath1371.03020MaRDI QIDQ5247342

Harvey Lederman

Publication date: 24 April 2015

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000380

zbMATH Keywords

rationality; common knowledge; agreement; Aumann's key conditional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

03B48: Probability and inductive logic

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

Related Items

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