People with common priors can agree to disagree
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Publication:5247342
DOI10.1017/S1755020314000380zbMATH Open1371.03020OpenAlexW2313484396MaRDI QIDQ5247342FDOQ5247342
Authors: Harvey Lederman 
Publication date: 24 April 2015
Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000380
Recommendations
Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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- Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
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Cited In (10)
- Agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
- Uncommon priors require origin disputes
- Quantum version of Aumann's approach to common knowledge: sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree
- Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
- Possibility to agree on disagree from quantum information and decision making
- Standard state space models of unawareness (extended abstract)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: an extension of the sure-thing principle
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