People with common priors can agree to disagree

DOI10.1017/S1755020314000380zbMATH Open1371.03020OpenAlexW2313484396MaRDI QIDQ5247342FDOQ5247342

Authors Harvey Lederman

Publication date 24 April 2015

Published in The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000380

zbMATH Keywords

agreementrationalitycommon knowledgeAumann's key conditional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795590 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agreeing to disagree
• Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures
• Agreeing to disagree: the non-probabilistic case
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Comment of consensus without common knowledge
• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Learning to agree
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption

Cited in

(10)

• Possibility to agree on disagree from quantum information and decision making
• Agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge
• Standard state space models of unawareness (extended abstract)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450025 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568759 (Why is no real title available?)
• The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: an extension of the sure-thing principle
• Uncommon priors require origin disputes
• Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
• Quantum version of Aumann's approach to common knowledge: sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree

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