Agreeing to Disagree

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_40zbMath1384.03097OpenAlexW4255278005MaRDI QIDQ2971703

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 7 April 2017

Published in: Readings in Formal Epistemology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_40

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reaching a Consensus
• Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets