Agreement theorems in dynamic-epistemic logic

DOI10.1007/s10992-012-9236-4zbMath1261.03078WikidataQ62045092 ScholiaQ62045092MaRDI QIDQ692182

Oliver Roy, Cédric Dégremont

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9236-4

zbMATH Keywords

information; belief revision; hybrid logic; fixed-point logic; agreement theorems; dynamic-epistemic logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

Related Items

Logic and Game Theory, AGREEMENT THEOREMS FOR SELF-LOCATING BELIEF, Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic~logic, Counterfactuals in ``agreeing to disagree type results

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