Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games
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The author argues that maximin strategies may be at least as attractive as Nash equilibrium strategies in games where the large population arguments do not apply, e.g., in games in which players cannot assess precisely the probabilities with which their opponents randomize, or in games in which players each time face new opponents and the history of past play is not available.
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- Ambiguous games
- An experimental investigation of unprofitable games.
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Game theory
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
- Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
- Some interesting properties of maximin strategies
- Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Cited in
(11)- Exhausting strategies, joker games and full completeness for IMLL with unit
- The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem
- The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
- An experimental investigation of unprofitable games.
- Maximin and minimax strategies in two-players game with two strategic variables
- Effective choice in all the symmetric \(2\times 2\) games
- Maximin and minimax strategies in two-players game with two strategic variables
- Justifying optimal play via consistency
- Some interesting properties of maximin strategies
- Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
- Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?
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