Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games

DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9376-1zbMath1292.91010OpenAlexW1975256383MaRDI QIDQ2015026

Vitaly Pruzhansky

Publication date: 18 June 2014

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9376-1

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsexperimentsbounded rationalityminimax strategiesmixed strategy equilibriaBayesian play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types

Cites Work

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