Knowledge, time, and paradox: introducing sequential epistemic logic

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_15MaRDI QIDQ3299584zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wesley H. Holliday

Publication date 24 July 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_15

zbMATH Keywords

anti-performatory announcementsdynamic epistemic logicFitch's paradox of knowabilityMoorean announcementssequential epistemic logicsurprise exam paradoxtemporal logicunassimilable announcements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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Cites work

• `Knowable' as `known after an announcement'
• A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a Knowability Principle
• A logical analysis of some value concepts
• Connecting dynamic epistemic and temporal epistemic logics
• Dynamic epistemic logic
• Dynamic epistemic logic and temporal modality
• Dynamic epistemic logic with branching temporal structures
• Dynamic epistemic temporal logic
• Dynamic logic of preference upgrade
• Elusive knowledge
• Expressivity and completeness for public update logics via reduction axioms
• Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities
• Handbook of epistemic logic
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6302912 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information dynamics and uniform substitution
• Logic for update products and steps into the past
• Logical dynamics of information and interaction
• Logics of temporal-epistemic actions
• Merging frameworks for interaction
• Moorean phenomena in epistemic logic
• Reasoning about information change
• Schematic Validity in Dynamic Epistemic Logic: Decidability
• The secret of my success
• The surprise examination in dynamic epistemic logic
• The surprise examination paradox in dynamic epistemic logic
• What one may come to know

Cited in

(6)

• To be announced
• Everything is learnable, once it is settled
• Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection
• Unknown truths and unknowable truths
• The dynamic approach to knowability
• The surprise examination in dynamic epistemic logic

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