Moore's paradox as an argument against anti-realism

DOI10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_4zbMATH Open1257.03017OpenAlexW934436770MaRDI QIDQ2908757FDOQ2908757

Authors: Jon Cogburn 

Publication date: 29 August 2012

Published in: The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cited In (4)

• Moore's paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox
• The Bayesian account of the defect in Moorean reasoning
• Moore's paradox and self-ascribed Belief
• The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore's paradox in belief: a reply to Chan

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