Moore's paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox

DOI10.1007/S11229-008-9403-XMaRDI QIDQ987467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Martínez

Publication date 13 August 2010

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9403-x

zbMATH Keywords

beliefself-refutationfirst personG. E. MooreMoore's Paradoxpragmatic paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1952952 (Why is no real title available?)
• Identity, intensionality, and Moore's paradox
• On the logic of demonstratives

Cited in

(6)

• Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test
• An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes
• Moore's paradox and self-ascribed Belief
• Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief
• The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore's paradox in belief: a reply to Chan
• Moore's paradox: an Evansian account

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