Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox

DOI10.1007/S11225-007-9070-9MaRDI QIDQ2464652zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rafał Palczewski

Publication date 17 December 2007

Published in Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9

zbMATH Keywords

anti-realismFitch's paradoxgroup knowledgeknowabilitymodal epistemic logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Review text

In recent years, formal epistemologists have been interested in the task of representing, in some kind of modal logic, the claim that all truths are knowable. The simplest such representation in the literature is \(x\to Sx\), where \(x\) is any propositional variable, \(S\) is a one-place modal operator for ``someone knows, and the arrow is truth-functional implication. A more nuanced one is \(x\to PSx\) where \(P\) is an operator for possibility. In this paper, the author discusses apparent difficulties with the latter representation, and proposes instead \(x\to PDx\), where \(D\) is a modal operator for distributed knowledge, i.e. \(Dx\) means that \(x\) is a logical consequence of pooling of what different agents know.

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Cited in

(2)

• The many faces of closure and introspection. An ineractive perspective
• Closure on knowability

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