Wright's strict finitistic logic in the classical metatheory: the propositional case
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Publication:6166126
DOI10.1007/S10992-022-09698-WarXiv2301.12070OpenAlexW4317637367MaRDI QIDQ6166126FDOQ6166126
Authors: Takahiro Yamada 
Publication date: 2 August 2023
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Crispin Wright in his 1982 paper argues for strict finitism, a constructive standpoint that is more restrictive than intuitionism. In its appendix, he proposes models of strict finitistic arithmetic. They are tree-like structures, formed in his strict finitistic metatheory, of equations between numerals on which concrete arithmetical sentences are evaluated. As a first step towards classical formalisation of strict finitism, we propose their counterparts in the classical metatheory with one additional assumption, and then extract the propositional part of `strict finitistic logic' from it and investigate. We will provide a sound and complete pair of a Kripke-style semantics and a sequent calculus, and compare with other logics. The logic lacks the law of excluded middle and Modus Ponens and is weaker than classical logic, but stronger than any proper intermediate logics in terms of theoremhood. In fact, all the other well-known classical theorems are found to be theorems. Finally, we will make an observation that models of this semantics can be seen as nodes of an intuitionistic model.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.12070
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