New foundations for a relational theory of theory-revision

DOI10.1007/s10992-006-9027-xzbMath1108.03021MaRDI QIDQ2499309

Neil Tennant

Publication date: 14 August 2006

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-006-9027-x

zbMATH Keywords

contraction; belief change; revision; AGM

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

Related Items

A model for structural changes of belief, Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents, Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision, FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTEXT AND CONTENT: INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, BELIEF-REVISION, THE RAMSEY TEST, MONOTONICITY, AND THE SO-CALLED IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS

Cites Work

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• On the degeneracy of the full AGM-theory of theory-revision