The Church-Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory

DOI10.1007/s11229-012-0061-7zbMath1284.03071OpenAlexW1988047824MaRDI QIDQ2443327

Sara Negri, Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo

Publication date: 7 April 2014

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0061-7

zbMATH Keywords

proof analysisstructural proof theorylabelled sequent calculusknowability principleChurch-Fitch's paradoxintuitionistic bimodal logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Structure of proofs (03F07)

Related Items

Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic IEL ⋮ Labeled sequent calculi for modal logics and implicit contractions ⋮ A first-order expansion of Artemov and Protopopescu's intuitionistic epistemic logic ⋮ On a new tentative solution to Fitch's paradox ⋮ Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis ⋮ Proofs and countermodels in non-classical logics ⋮ GEOMETRISATION OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC ⋮ From mathematical axioms to mathematical rules of proof: recent developments in proof analysis

Uses Software

• Pesca

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic?
• Proof analysis in intermediate logics
• Intuitionistic epistemic logic, Kripke models and Fitch's paradox
• Proof analysis in modal logic
• Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities
• Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics
• Contraction-free sequent calculi for geometric theories with an application to Barr's theorem
• Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic
• New Essays on the Knowability Paradox
• Proof Analysis
• Proof and Paradox
• Cut Elimination in the Presence of Axioms
• Victor's error
• A logical analysis of some value concepts
• Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant