Intuitionistic epistemic logic, Kripke models and Fitch's paradox

DOI10.1007/S10992-011-9207-1zbMATH Open1280.03020OpenAlexW2018517747MaRDI QIDQ692189FDOQ692189

Authors: Carlo Proietti 

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9207-1

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zbMATH Keywords

epistemic logicintuitionistic logicKripke modelsFitch's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic
• What one may come to know
• Epistemology without knowledge and without belief
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mathematical modal logic: A view of its evolution
• Models for stronger normal intuitionistic modal logics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics

Cited In (15)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• INTUITIONISTIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC
• A first-order expansion of Artemov and Protopopescu's intuitionistic epistemic logic
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Church-Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory
• Intuitionistic epistemology and modal logics of verification
• Logics for knowability paradox with a non-normal possibility operator
• On a side effect of solving Fitch's paradox by typing knowledge
• Intuitionistic common knowledge or belief
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
• Topological models of epistemic set theory
• Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
• On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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