A contextual-hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox

DOI10.1023/B:LOGI.0000019227.09236.f5zbMath1048.03005MaRDI QIDQ1876081

Michael Glanzberg

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/b:logi.0000019227.09236.f5

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradox; truth; infinitary logic; hierarchy; context dependence; admissible sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

03C70: Logic on admissible sets

Related Items

SUPER LIARS, Psychophysiological approach to the liar paradox: Jean Buridan's virtual entailment principle put to the test, Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes, Bicontextualism, Contextual-hierarchical reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, The justification of the basic laws of logic, Sets and supersets, Contextualism, relativism and the liar, Paradox and logical revision. A short introduction, Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox, Truth, reflection and hierarchies, Conditionals in theories of truth, Against stepping back: A critique of contextualist approaches to the semantic paradoxes, A principled solution to Fitch's paradox, Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes, PARADOXES OF INTENSIONALITY, A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

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