A formal approach to the problem of logical non-omniscience
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Publication:3384071
zbMATH Open1483.68377arXiv1707.08747MaRDI QIDQ3384071FDOQ3384071
Authors: Tsvi Benson-Tilsen, Andrew Critch, Nate Soares, Jessica Taylor, Scott M. Garrabrant
Publication date: 14 December 2021
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08747
Recommendations
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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