Nash codes for noisy channels

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2014.1311MaRDI QIDQ2941418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Hernández, Bernhard von Stengel

Publication date 28 August 2015

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.1547, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.751.8627

zbMATH Keywords

communicationnoisy channelsender-receiver game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Communication theory (94A05) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40)

Abstract: This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observation holds for communication over a binary channel which is used independently a number of times, a basic model of information transmission: Under a minimal "monotonicity" requirement for breaking ties when decoding, which holds generically, EVERY code is a Nash code.

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Cited in

(7)

• Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
• Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case
• Nonuniform Fuchsian codes for noisy channels
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• A Nash equilibrium related to the Poisson channel
• Beyond the Blackwell order in dichotomies
• Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests

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