The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
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Publication:4833987
DOI10.2307/2951695zbMATH Open0827.90047OpenAlexW4253574404MaRDI QIDQ4833987FDOQ4833987
Authors: Robert H. Porter 
Publication date: 13 December 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951695
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Cited In (13)
- Indirect inference in structural econometric models
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Mean sample spacings, sample size and variability in an auction-theoretic framework.
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Selling options
- Auctions
- Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
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