The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction

DOI10.2307/2951695MaRDI QIDQ4833987zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert H. Porter

Publication date 13 December 1995

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2951695

zbMATH Keywords

informationauctionsbidding for leasesoil and gas leases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Indirect inference in structural econometric models
• Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
• Mean sample spacings, sample size and variability in an auction-theoretic framework.
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Selling options
• Auctions

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