The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction

DOI10.2307/2951695zbMath0827.90047OpenAlexW4253574404MaRDI QIDQ4833987

Robert H. Porter

Publication date: 13 December 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951695

zbMATH Keywords

informationauctionsbidding for leasesoil and gas leases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types ⋮ Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ On efficiency of the English auction ⋮ Mean sample spacings, sample size and variability in an auction-theoretic framework. ⋮ Selling options ⋮ Auctions ⋮ Information structures in optimal auctions ⋮ Indirect inference in structural econometric models ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions

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