Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.001zbMath1331.91091OpenAlexW1616011391MaRDI QIDQ899375

Javier Rivas

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/46620/1/Mechanism_Design_and_Bounded_Rationality.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• The robustness of robust implementation
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
• Supermodular mechanism design
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Robust Mechanism Design

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