Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.08.001zbMATH Open1331.91091OpenAlexW1616011391MaRDI QIDQ899375FDOQ899375

Javier Rivas

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/46620/1/Mechanism_Design_and_Bounded_Rationality.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
• Supermodular mechanism design
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont

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