A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111548MaRDI QIDQ6154267zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sarvesh Bandhu, Rohit Kumar

Publication date 19 March 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111548

zbMATH Keywords

population monotonicitypreference replacementsocial choice functionstatus quowelfare dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• Locating libraries on a street
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Random dictatorship domains
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Tops-only domains
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions

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