Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
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Publication:430916
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9286-zzbMath1241.91042OpenAlexW2040565240MaRDI QIDQ430916
Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu, Lainé, Jean
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9286-z
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