Social choice by majority rule with rational participation

DOI10.1007/BF00182189MaRDI QIDQ1804565zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David Sunding

Publication date 15 May 1995

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleparticipation equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(17)

• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• On the invariance of a mean voter theorem
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6258504 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18299 (Why is no real title available?)
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930664 (Why is no real title available?)
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Majority-approval social choice
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy
• Assent-maximizing social choice
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Rational decision principle and social choice function
• A power rule for social choice
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

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