Social choice by majority rule with rational participation

DOI10.1007/BF00182189zbMATH Open0834.90013MaRDI QIDQ1804565FDOQ1804565

Authors: David Sunding 

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleparticipation equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (15)

• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• On the invariance of a mean voter theorem
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy
• Assent-maximizing social choice
• Rational decision principle and social choice function
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• A power rule for social choice

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