On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0408-2MaRDI QIDQ2268893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sonali Roy, Maria Axenovich

Publication date 15 March 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
• A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
• A new short proof for the Kruskal-Katona theorem
• Complete games with minimum
• Complete simple games
• Enumeration of intersecting families
• Hierarchies achievable in simple games
• How to assign votes in a distributed system
• On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
• Shadows and shifting
• Voting fairly: Transitive maximal intersecting families of sets
• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power

Cited in

(8)

• On the enumeration of bipartite simple games
• Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
• On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions
• Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value
• Mathematical structures of simple voting games

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