On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2268893
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0408-2zbMATH Open1201.91046OpenAlexW2070596219MaRDI QIDQ2268893FDOQ2268893
Authors: Sonali Roy, Maria Axenovich 
Publication date: 15 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Complete simple games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How to assign votes in a distributed system
- On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
- Hierarchies achievable in simple games
- A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Enumeration of intersecting families
- A new short proof for the Kruskal-Katona theorem
- Voting fairly: Transitive maximal intersecting families of sets
- Complete games with minimum
- Shadows and shifting
- A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
Cited In (8)
- Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value
- On the enumeration of bipartite simple games
- An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
- Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
- Mathematical structures of simple voting games
- On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
This page was built for publication: On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2268893)
