On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
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Publication:2268893
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2zbMath1201.91046OpenAlexW2070596219MaRDI QIDQ2268893
Sonali Roy, Maria A. Axenovich
Publication date: 15 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2
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