scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847165
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0512.00031.] This chapter consists of a detailed investigation of the relationship between simple games and social choice correspondences. Section 2 contains the necessary definitions. We begin our investigation in section 3 by associating three simple games, which are derived from three different notions of effectiveness, with every social choice correspondence. We proceed with a study of the properties of, and the interrelations between, the three simple games. Then we consider several examples, incuding the Borda rule. A social choice correspondence is tight if our three notions of effectiveness coincide for it. We conclude section 3 by demonstrating that certain conditions are sufficient for tightness. In section 4 we consider the converse problem, namely that of representing simple games by social choice correspondences. We find sufficient conditions for tightness of representations, and prove, by constructing suitable examples, the existence of tight and nice representations. We also have the following interesting result which ties our representation theory with the core. Let \(G=(N,W)\) be a simple game and let A be a finite set of m alternatives, \(m\geq 2\). Then, there exists a strongly monotonic representation of G of order m, if and only if for every profile of preferences (on A) \(R^ N\) the core of G, with respect to A and \(R^ N\), is not empty.
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