scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847165

MaRDI QIDQ3316906zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg

Publication date 1983

zbMATH Keywords

512.00031Borda rulesimple gamessocial choice correspondencestightness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
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Cited in

(7)

• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• On a compromise social choice correspondence
• A new proof of Monjardet's median theorem
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
• A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

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