A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers

DOI10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11zbMath1504.91076OpenAlexW4285284274MaRDI QIDQ5049409

Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: Translational Systems Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyNash equilibriumcorecommitteesconsensusgroup decision and negotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
• Non-cooperative games
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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