A model of consensus and consensus building within the framework of committees with permissible ranges of decision makers
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Publication:5049409
DOI10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11zbMATH Open1504.91076OpenAlexW4285284274MaRDI QIDQ5049409FDOQ5049409
Authors: Takehiro Inohara 
Publication date: 11 November 2022
Published in: Translational Systems Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11
Recommendations
Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
Cited In (5)
- A model to support the search for consensus with conflicting rankings: Multitrident
- Reaching consensus in multiagent decision making
- Composite consensus-building process: permissible meeting analysis and compromise choice exploration
- Consensus reaching in committees
- A consensus model of political decision-making
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