A model of consensus and consensus building within the framework of committees with permissible ranges of decision makers
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5049409
Recommendations
Cites Work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
- Non-cooperative games
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Cited In (5)
- A model to support the search for consensus with conflicting rankings: Multitrident
- Reaching consensus in multiagent decision making
- Composite consensus-building process: permissible meeting analysis and compromise choice exploration
- Consensus reaching in committees
- A consensus model of political decision-making
This page was built for publication: A model of consensus and consensus building within the framework of committees with permissible ranges of decision makers
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5049409)