Decomposable effectivity functions

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00831-1zbMATH Open0943.91508OpenAlexW2031790849MaRDI QIDQ1290123FDOQ1290123

Ton Storcken, Gertjan D. Otten, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs

Publication date: 17 August 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00831-1

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zbMATH Keywords

decomposabilityTU gamesechelon formeffectivity functionsrevealed power property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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• Effectivity functions and simple games
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• Correlated effectivity functions

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