Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862972 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Effectivity functions and simple games
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
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