Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1043MaRDI QIDQ1338968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steinar Holden

Publication date 27 November 1994

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1043

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingunique subgame perfect equilibriumflow of tradesRubinstein alternating offers bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bargaining without commitment
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Cited in

(4)

• Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment
• Bargaining in a long-term relationship with endogenous termination
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Bargaining without commitment

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