Summary: This paper is a partial review of the literature on `social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning.
- Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments
- Parameters of social preference functions: measurement and external validity
- Social image concern and reference point formation
- Social framing effects: preferences or beliefs?
- Preference based subjective beliefs
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
- Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior
- Promises and Partnership
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?
- Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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