Responder feelings in a three-player three-option ultimatum game: affective determinants of rejection behavior
Summary: This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are likely candidates as affective determinants. We introduce a three-player ultimatum game with three-options, which permits the responder to either penalize the proposer or to penalize a third party by rejecting offers. This allows for partially distinguishing rejections due to a retaliation motive driven by anger towards the proposer from rejections due to inequity aversion driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of dissatisfaction and unfairness if their share is small in comparison to the proposer's share; anger, then, may trigger rejections towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares; however, in contrast to anger, envy does not trigger rejections and is dissociated from the decision to accept or reject an offer. We conclude that acting upon anger is socially acceptable, whereas envy is not acceptable as a reason for action. Furthermore, we find that responders generally feel better after rejections, suggesting that rejections serve to regulate one's affective state.
- Frustration and anger in the ultimatum game: an experiment
- Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior
- Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
- Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments
- Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining
- A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A theory of reciprocity
- Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
- Mixed-Effects Models in S and S-PLUS
- Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
- Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter
- The somatic marker hypothesis: a neural theory of economic decision
- Ultimatum decision-making: a test of reciprocal kindness
- Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
- Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior
- Impunity under pressure: on the role of emotions as a commitment device
- Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments
- Frustration and anger in the ultimatum game: an experiment
- Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy
- Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information
This page was built for publication: Responder feelings in a three-player three-option ultimatum game: affective determinants of rejection behavior
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2345019)
