Cooperation between emotional players

DOI10.3390/G11040045MaRDI QIDQ2223649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lina Andersson

Publication date 1 February 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040045

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationemotionsrepeated prisoners' dilemmastochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Review text

Summary: This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player's psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player's utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players' material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished.

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Cited in

(5)

• Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players
• Affective empathy in non-cooperative games
• Introduction to the special issue ``pro-sociality and cooperation
• Game dynamics of emotion evolution based on the Moran process
• Direct emotional interaction in prisoner's dilemma game

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