Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.02.047MaRDI QIDQ1737501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sumit Sarkar

Publication date 23 April 2019

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.02.047

zbMATH Keywords

psychological game theoryprincipal-agent problembehavioural ORnon-contractible quality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5076448 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A theory of reciprocity
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
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• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Generous, spiteful, or profit maximizing suppliers in the wholesale price contract: a behavioral study
• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Promises and Partnership
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Reciprocal supply chain with intention
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Supply-chain performance anomalies: fairness concerns under private cost information
• Surprising gifts: theory and laboratory evidence
• The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships: an experimental study
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(6)

• The effect of risk aversion on the optimal project resource rate
• Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems
• Roles of reciprocity and fairness concerns in airline-airport systems with environmental considerations
• Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
• Disclosing products' freshness level as a non-contractible quality: optimal logistics service contracts in the fresh products supply chain
• Coordinating a closed loop supply chain with fairness concern by a constant wholesale price contract

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