Perception and information in a competitive location model

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00137-9zbMath0943.90055MaRDI QIDQ1296002

H. A. Eiselt

Publication date: 10 September 2000

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

competitionhypergameStackelberg gamelocation modelsgame with incomplete informationpioneering advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

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Cites Work

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