A foundation for strategic agenda voting
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Publication:485757
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.006zbMATH Open1302.91071OpenAlexW2033504908MaRDI QIDQ485757FDOQ485757
Authors: Jose Apesteguia, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Miguel A. Ballester 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19910
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Choice by sequential procedures
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- On the justice of decision rules
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
- A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design
- Choosing from a tournament
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Cited In (10)
- Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
- Social Choice Theory
- A theory of iterative choice in lists
- Revealed votes
- How to Put through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
- Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
- Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
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