Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- Choice by sequential procedures
- Choosing from a tournament
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- On the justice of decision rules
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
Cited in
(13)- Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
- Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes
- Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
- A theory of iterative choice in lists
- Social Choice Theory
- Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
- Revealed votes
- Agendas in legislative decision-making
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- How to Put through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
- Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
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