“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game
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Publication:6180412
DOI10.3982/te5330arXiv2209.04892MaRDI QIDQ6180412
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.04892
Cites Work
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- Univariate Discrete Distributions
- Relative loss bounds for on-line density estimation with the exponential family of distributions
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