Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs

DOI10.1007/s00712-022-00810-xzbMath1518.91079OpenAlexW4312131274WikidataQ123335156 ScholiaQ123335156MaRDI QIDQ6158338

Margherita Saraceno, Giorgio Rampa

Publication date: 20 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00810-x

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningrisk aversionsettlementconjectural equilibriaconsumer litigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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