Adaptive learning and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games: An ARCH(1) approach
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Cites work
- Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
- Adaptive learning and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games: An ARCH(1) approach
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- ARCH modeling in finance. A review of the theory and empirical evidence
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Generalised residuals
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- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Learning to Believe in Sunspots
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Residual analysis in the grouped and censored normal linear model
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
Cited in
(11)- Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation
- Adaptive learning and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games: An ARCH(1) approach
- Robustness of binary choice models to conditional heteroscedasticity
- An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games
- Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
- An adaptive learning model in coordination games
- Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
- Delegation using forward induction
- Modeling noisy learning in a dynamic oligopoly experiment
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- The emergence of coordination in public good games
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