Counter-Factual Reinforcement Learning: How to Model Decision-Makers That Anticipate the Future

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-36406-8_4zbMath1346.68161arXiv1207.0852OpenAlexW2099342494MaRDI QIDQ2822302

Russell Bent, Scott Backhaus, Ritchie Lee, Brendan D. Tracey, David H. Wolpert, James Bono

Publication date: 30 September 2016

Published in: Decision Making and Imperfection (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.0852

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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