Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment-dominance relations

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0104-3zbMath1149.91020MaRDI QIDQ933749

Takuya Masuzawa

Publication date: 25 July 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0104-3

zbMATH Keywords

NTU games; Polynomial-time algorithms; Public good provision; Reduced games; The \(\alpha\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• How to share the cost of a public good
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
• The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the \(\alpha\)-core
• A note on NTU convexity
• Punishment strategies make the \(\alpha\)-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• Cores of convex games
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory
• Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games
• The Approximation of Fixed Points of a Continuous Mapping
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games