Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
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Publication:1995466
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.004zbMATH Open1458.91078OpenAlexW3110285291MaRDI QIDQ1995466FDOQ1995466
Randolph Sloof, Arthur Schram, Junze Sun
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.004
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Cites Work
- Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Quantal Response Equilibrium
- Elections with platform and valence competition
- Elicitation using multiple price list formats
- A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition
- Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social control
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