Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2348757
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0856-1zbMath1318.91165OpenAlexW1993134493MaRDI QIDQ2348757
Publication date: 15 June 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0856-1
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Cites Work
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Herding with collective preferences
- Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Optimal Statistical Decisions
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System
- Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting