Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(86)90011-XzbMath0619.90015OpenAlexW2034432288MaRDI QIDQ1090219

David A. Malueg

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90011-x

zbMATH Keywords

discountingmoral hazardefficient outcomesPareto efficient utility allocationsrepeated principal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

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• Acceptable points in games of perfect information
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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