CRRA utility and the sustainability of cooperation in infinitely-repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110897MaRDI QIDQ2681798zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David R. Collie

Publication date 30 January 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110897

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcritical discount factorCRRA utility functioninternational environmental agreementNash-reversion trigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Recommendations

• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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