Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0464-ZMaRDI QIDQ891342zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tadashi Sekiguchi

Publication date 17 November 2015

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/207640

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionmultimarket contactdemand fluctuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
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Cites work

• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

Cited in

(6)

• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Multimarket Contact in Vertically Related Markets
• Economic integration and the sustainability of multimarket collusion
• Collusion and cyclic pricing by managers in markets with fluctuating demand
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
• Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations

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