Collusion without conspiracy: An experimental study of one-sided auctions

DOI10.1023/A:1009929832148MaRDI QIDQ1971053zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Katerina Sherstyuk

Publication date 22 March 2000

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009929832148

zbMATH Keywords

tacit collusionauction experimentscollusion-nonfacilitating featuresone-sided auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Collusion through communication in auctions
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Cited in

(8)

• The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Collusion via resale
• Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
• Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games

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